Some accounts of exploitation, most notably the degradation-based
Introduction
It is widely agreed that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage. duties are either self-frustrating or over-demanding. I consider two possible solutions to these problems and conclude that the most promising is to omit self-caused disadvantage from the scope of these duties. That is, we exploit others when we fail to exercise constraint in light of others' disadvantage only if this disadvantage is the result of an injustice for which the disadvantaged is not responsible.
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1 See for example, Elster (1982) , Goodin (1987) , Sample (2003) , Steiner (1984 Steiner ( , 1987 , and Wertheimer (1996) . A dissenting view is proposed in Wood (1995) . In addition, in this paper I will focus on exploitation that occurs in transactions between individuals. My arguments do not necessarily apply to exploitation understood as a systemic phenomena affecting a particular class of individuals.
In the following section I outline two accounts that include versions of these
'come-what-may' duties: Ruth Sample's (2003) degradation-based account and Robert Goodin's (1987) vulnerability-based account. In section three, I present a case that creates problems for both accounts. In section four I consider two possible solutions to these problems, argue that omitting self-caused disadvantage from the domain of exploitable disadvantage is the best solution, and finally I address a general tension between fairness and come-what-may duties.
2 Come-what-may Duties Using 'advantage' to denote each of these features quickly becomes confusing.
Thus, in the arguments that follow I will use 'advantage' and 'disadvantage' to refer only to advantage as lack of vulnerability. I will use 'gain' (or occasionally benefit) to refer to advantage as gain and 'use' to refer to advantage as use.
4 .
Additionally, I will assume that the slogan 'exploitation involves taking unfair advantage' is equivalent to the expanded slogan, 'exploitation involves unfairly using another's disadvantage for gain'.
time, etc. Different accounts of responsibility will include and emphasise different conditions. But in what follows I simply suppose that whatever conditions are necessary to hold the agents responsible, these conditions are in fact met. 4 Two of these three forms of advantage are noted by Allen Wood. My use of 'advantage' corresponds to Wood's 'advantage exploitation'-our relation to that "which gives us a hold or advantage over the person". My 'gain' or 'benefit' corresponds to Wood's 'benefit exploitation'-the benefit we receive from advantage exploitation (Wood 1995: 8) counts of exploitation distinguish themselves from more restrictive accounts through their claims that mere disadvantage can generate exploitation, "regardless of the particular source" of disadvantage (Goodin 1987: 187) . For these accounts, the historical source of disadvantage is-to some degree-irrelevant to whether a transaction is exploitative; for some transactions non-historical properties of a transaction itself are sufficient to ground exploitation claims. 
Goodin's Account
Of the two accounts, Goodin's implies the widest scope for our duties to the disadvantaged (as we will see below, Sample's 'come-what-may' duties are already restricted to a sub-domain of disadvantage). According to Goodin, we exploit a person when we unfairly use of one of their attributes and, he claims, exploitation in general involves "playing for advantage [-as-gain] in situations where it is inappropriate to do so . . . [it] consists in playing games of strategy in circumstances which render them somehow inappropriate" (Goodin 1987: 184, emphasis in original). Furthermore, all cases where playing for strategy is inappropriate are "manifestations of one particular kind of wrong," namely, a failure to honour the moral norm of "protecting the vulnerable. . . regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability" (Goodin 1987: 187) . Thus, for Goodin, exploitation occurs when we use others' vulnerabilities to secure for ourselves some form of benefit in games of strategy, no matter the source of these vulnerabilities.
Taken at face value, Goodin's norm of protecting the vulnerable seems to make exploitation pervasive. It appears to render exploitative any transaction 5 Disadvantage may take many forms, but Goodin and Sample are primarily concerned with disadvantage as impoverishment, vulnerability, and disability. As discussed above, I use 'disadvantage' as an umbrella term for vulnerability and these similar states.
6 For Sample, the historical source of disadvantage is not always irrelevant. It is only irrelevant in cases involving a failure to meet basic needs, as discussed in section 2.2.
in which one transactor uses his or her advantage for gain. This seems odd, since (i) nearly all economic transactions involve unequal bargaining power and (ii) unequal bargaining power, ordinarily, seems to be a form of vulnerability. Yet, (iii) many 'ordinary' transactions do not appear unfair. It seems that Goodin should provide an explanation of this oddness. He might either address (iii), showing why we should consider most transactions unfair, or provide a response to (ii), explaining why the conception of vulnerability that he has in mind is narrower than our ordinary notion of vulnerability and thus explaining why mere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient for his notion of vulnerability. That is, though he claims that any form of vulnerability is potentially exploitable, perhaps Goodin's account of vulnerability is less inclusive then our ordinary conception.
Goodin provides an account of vulnerability in his book Protecting the Vulnerable, where he writes Vulnerability is a relational notion: a full specification will tell us who is vulnerable to whom with respect to what. . . . [Vulnerabilites are] also relative. A is more vulnerable to B (1) the more control B has over outcomes that affect A's interests and (2) the more heavily A's interests are at stake in the outcomes that B controls (Goodin 1986: 118) .
Thus, for Goodin, B is vulnerable to A with respect to x when A has the ability to control x and x has an impact on B. The scope of this conception of vulnerability does not appear narrower than the scope of vulnerability in ordinary use. In lieu of a restriction of the scope of vulnerability, Goodin must provide a convincing argument for why we should believe most transactions are exploitative. And indeed, Goodin does provide such an argument, albeit one that I will argue is not fully convincing. However, before considering Goodin's defense of his relatively expansive conception of exploitation (in section 4.2) I want to consider the come-what-may duties that appear in Sample's account and an outline of the problems these duties create for both accounts.
Sample's Account
According to Sample's account of 'exploitation as degradation', exploitation involves "interacting with another being for the sake of advantage [-as-gain] in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being" (Sample 2003: 57) . She claims these failures of respect take three general forms. We can fail to show proper respect for-degrade-the value of another by:
D1 "Taking advantage [-as-use] of an injustice done to him."
D2 "Neglecting what is necessary for that person's well-being or flourishing." D3 "Treating as a fungible object of market exchange, an aspect of that person's being that ought not to be commodified" (Sample 2003: 57, lettering added).
The first form of degradation, D1, involves disadvantage caused by historical injustice: "If a person is in a weaker bargaining position because of a past injustice, we stand to gain disproportionately in virtue of that injustice" (Sample 2003: 82) . For example, if C steals B's wallet and A uses the disadvantage created by this theft to gain more than he otherwise would have in a transaction with B, A exploits B.
The second form of degradation involves a form of disadvantage that is ahistorical. Here Sample claims that well-being or flourishing are best captured by what she variously calls 'basic needs' and 'capabilities'. She argues that transactions can be degrading when "the [impoverished] capabilities of our interactors are ignored in the pursuit of our own advantage[-as-gain]" (Sample 2003: 81 
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In the next section I present a case that exemplifies the over-demandingness problem for Goodin's account and that forces a conflict of duties for Sample's account. I show that both problems can be resolved by abandoning the broad come-what-may duties contained in each account. However, before doing so I want to briefly comment on Sample's non-commodification condition, D3.
9 This does not mean that exploitation is a binary concept. There may also be degrees of exploitation. Nor does this mean that all levels of exploitation require the same form of response. For example, some exploitation may be strong enough to justify state enforced prohibition, while weaker forms of exploitation do not. Rather, the claim is that exploitation (caused by a failure to respect D2) begins when we neglect others' basic needs. Greater neglect of these basic needs may amount to greater exploitation. 10 Sample does not specify a criterion for determining the duties that D2 implies for A. One possibility is that if B's basic needs are unmet pre-transaction A must, ensure they are met post-transaction. But this is surely too strong. More likely is a criterion according to which A must forgo the gain he would receive from transacting, either up to the point that B's basic needs are met, or up to the point at which he would make a loss from transacting, whichever comes first. This is consistant with Sample's caveat that "if the only beneficial interaction possible is one in which [basic] needs cannot be satisfied, then such interaction is not exploitative" (Sample 2003: 75) .
The arguments that follow pertain to the problems that arise from Sample's inclusion of cases that lie in D2, but not D1. D3 is excluded from the criticism because, without denying that they may be degrading or disrespectful, I am unconvinced transactions falling only within Sample's D3 are exploitative. When A buys sex from B, if the transaction is degrading for only the reason that sex ought not be commodified, then it seems that both A and B are degraded by the transaction. Neither is relatively disadvantaged with respect to the other.
Yet, if exploitation involves taking unfair advantage-as-use of another's vulnerability, then it must be the case that one of A or B is relatively disadvantaged.
While it seems natural to say that A-the buyer-is the advantaged party in cases of prostitution, the belief that A is unfairly advantaged is likely due to our belief that it is unfair (for reasons stemming from either D1 or D2) that B is in a position in which she must sell her services as a prostitute. If neither D1 nor D2 hold and A and B are equals in terms of power, resources, etc, and B is not disadvantaged through past injustice, it is not clear that either party is relatively disadvantaged.
11 If neither is relatively disadvantaged, there can be no exploitation. Indeed Sample makes just this point when she writes, "I reject the idea that a person could be exploited if no vulnerability is made use of" (Sample 2003: 83) . She claims that when D1 and D2 are not violated but a person "nonetheless chooses to transact in a way that would violate a putative restriction on exchange, [they are] not exploited. . . however, [they] may be degraded if the appropriate case against commodification can be made" (Sample 2003: 83) . These arguments, along with Sample's own claims, indicate that D3
is not a separate source of exploitation, but rather falls within D1 and D2. Its inclusion as a separate form of degradation plays only a rhetorical role.
In some contexts Goodin's and Sample's claims appear plausible. In sweatshops, labour firms fail to constrain their bargaining advantage when employing the severely disadvantaged. These are paradigmatic cases of exploitation and their being so is not, so it seems, dependent on the source of these workers' disadvantage. When workers are extremely vulnerable, using this vulnerability for self-enrichment seems to be a clear case of exploitation, regardless of how the workers became vulnerable. Despite this initial plausibility, as we saw above, both accounts appear to face certain difficulties and these difficulties appear more clearly in the following case.
The Sequential Game Case
Consider the following sequential game, Γ 1 .
Stage 1: Consider the following two lotteries, L 1 and L 2 . Suppose that A is presented with a choice between the lotteries, but B is (for whatever reason) committed to L 2 .
Stage 2 Constraint BN operationalises Sample's D2, the claim that we degrade others when we neglect what is necessary for their well-being. Sample argues that "if we can interact with persons so that their basic needs are taken into account through the transaction, we ought to" (Sample 2003: 75) . Thus, employers should pay their employees enough to ensure their basic needs are met. In Γ 1 , this amount is set at $10, but the problem that the case presents does not depend on the particular value given to BN.
12
In the strategic form of Γ 1 shown in figure 1 below, 'A' and 'B' denote the players, '0' a chance node, and 'C', 'W', and 'E' represent the options 'cooperate', 'work for', and 'employ' respectively.
When B is committed to L 2 , which lottery should A (rationally) choose? We can answer this question using backward induction. First, consider the bottom branch of figure 1, supposing A chooses L 2 . In this case, the players will be equally wealthy, each receiving $50. They may choose to form a cooperative venture or refrain from cooperating, but clearly it is in the interest of each to cooperate, so the outcome of A choosing L 2 is ($55.50, $55.50).
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12 This is true in the sense that the basic needs level may be set at any point. The case does depend on BN being $10 given the other figures in the game. That is, the relative differences in the values of the payoffs associated with L 1 , L 2 and BN matter.
13 I represent outcomes as: (A, B) and action profiles as A, B . The presentation and discussion that follow assume A and B are risk neutral over monetary outcomes of the lotteries. Though this assumption is admittedly unrealistic, it would be possible to construct cases for which the currency was utility rather than money. Risk-neutrality with respect to utility outcomes is less controversial. However, I have opted to present the problem in money-space because an example that relied on utilities would sacrifice simplicity for (unnecessary) realism. Finally, note that Γ 1 has two odd features. First, the production process-which results in gains of only $11-is such that it is impossible for both individuals to satisfy BN without drawing from their stock of wealth. Second, these small profits mean that satisfying the BN requirement if A loses the lottery requires B to forgo a large proportion ( 10 11 ) of the gains from production. These features do not dissolve the criticism I will outline below, they may raise Suppose A chooses L 1 . Then, there are two equiprobable possibilities: either A will win the lottery, or A will lose the lottery. Suppose A loses. Then after the lottery A will be poorest. He can choose to work for B or to remain unemployed and B can choose whether to employ A, but it is in the interest of both to choose employment. Since post-lottery A has $0, BN holds. B must pay A $10 in wages, but she may keep $1 for herself. The outcome of a lottery loss is thus ($10, $51). Suppose A wins the lottery. Here A is the wealthiest player. And again, it is rational for both players to choose employment. This time A is the employer and, since both players' holdings are greater than $10, BN doesn't apply. A will pay B $5, keeping $6 for himself in profits. Thus, the outcome questions about the scope of the criticism. However, the problematic features for Sample's and Goodin's accounts that I will identify below remain regardless of whether the production process generates profits of $11 or, say, $111. That is, regardless of the profits generated by the productive process, come-what-may duties imply that A is able to take unfair advantage of a moral hazard.
of a lottery win is ($106, $55). Since a lottery win and a lottery loss are both equally likely, the expected value of choosing L 1 is 1 2 the outcome of a win and 1 2 the outcome of a loss, or ($58, $53). Since the expected value of L 1 is greater for A than the expected value of L 2 , A will rationally choose L 1 .
L 2 $55.50, $55.50 If either of these gains are also unfair, then in a pre-theoretical sense, A exploits B. Note that because A receives these benefits at separate times, the locus of the exploitative act (assuming the gains are, in fact, unfair) depends on whether the ex post or ex ante perspective is adopted. This leaves us with three questions:
Which perspective on gain-ex post or ex ante-is morally relevant for exploitation?
Are the gains received in either perspective unfair?
If so, is the resulting exploitation problematic for Sample's account? 
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Now consider ex post gain. Suppose A chooses L 1 and loses. Although he was better off than B before the lottery, he is now worse off. Having lost the lottery, is his ex post benefit-his actual receipt of the subsidy-really unfair?
Sample clearly thinks not. Respecting other persons should, so the argument goes, commit us to ensuring that our interactors' basic needs are in fact met, not that they might have been met had things gone differently. To claim the latter offers no consolation to the person who is starving now. Although this line of reasoning is, perhaps, initially attractive, it should be resisted. If A's ex ante gain is unfair, then A's ex post gain must also be unfair. This is so because the unfairness of the ex ante gain derives from the fact that A is in a position in which he could receive a subsidy for which he does not pay. If it is unfair for A to knowingly to put himself in a position where this might happen, it must 15 I should emphasise that the primary motivation for the intuition that A treates B unfairly is that A takes advantage of a moral hazard, and not that his welfare is, pre-choice, greater than B's. However, this latter point may be a minor contributing factor to the intuition of unfairness. (Steiner 1994: 197-198 ). So, Sample's account encounters problems regardless of whether the form of gain relevant to exploitation is ex ante gain or ex post gain. In the case of 16 Note that in one sense, this conflict can be avoided: A and B can simply avoid any kind of economic interaction. Because the obligation to transact non-exploitatively is a conditional obligation that arises only if one chooses to transact avoiding transactions also entails avoiding exploitations. But this does not dissolve the self-frustration problem for Sample's account, for we want to know what transactors' obligations are, should they choose to transact. Sample claims that she is And here Sample's account implies conditional obligations to both φ and ¬φ.
the former, her account is over-demanding; in the case of the latter it is selffrustrating. Before I address the problem that Γ 1 creates for Goodin's account, I will consider the final question: which form of gain is relevant to exploitation.
Moral Relevance. Suppose A chooses L 1 and receives unfair ex ante gain at B's expense. If exploitation involves unfair ex ante gain, then having chosen L 1 , a uses the disadvantage BN creates for B to extract unfair gain at B's expense.
That is, A has exploited B. But now suppose that though A initially intends to accept BN, upon losing the lottery he has a change of heart and rejects the subsidy. Though A has received unfair ex ante gain, it does not seem that any exploitation has occurred because A has not received any actual benefit. A's choice of L 1 is akin to attempted exploitation. The first concerns the way the priority problem is related to self-frustration. free-riding on moral hazards. Regardless of whether the problem is an internal problem of self-frustration or an external problem of scope the case presented in Γ 1 is problematic for Sample's account.
However, of these two possibilities, I believe the internal conflict is a more accurate, and indeed, more charitable description of the problem that Sample's account faces. While F2 may not be prohibited by any of the existing three forms of disrespect, it does appear to be implied by Sample's general claim from which she derives these three forms of disrespect. Sample writes "exploitation involves interacting with another being for advantage[-as-gain] in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being" (Sample 2003: 57) .
Surely using others' commitment to obligations like BN for self-enrichment at the others' expense involves a serious failure of respect both for their person and for the spirit of the moral commitment. If this is so, then a fourth form of disrespect is implied by Sample's general claim that exploitation involves disrespect or degradation and in this case, her account faces a problem of self-frustration: D2 implies F1 and the fourth form of disrespect, D4, implies F2.
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The second possible source of confusion concerns the way Sample's principles conflict. Initially it might seem that conflict is not possible. Perhaps, D1, D2, and D3 are all (along with some structural conditions) sufficient for exploitation. If multiple forms of degradation were present in a transaction, then the exploitation would simply be over determined; if A were guilty of D1 and B of D2, then they would mutually exploit each other.
It is true that D1-D3 need not conflict, but it is not true that they cannot 
Goodin's Over-demandingness Problem
I now turn my attention to the problems Γ 1 creates for Goodin's account. Recall that for Goodin exploitation involves a failure to respect the duty to protect the vulnerable, "regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability" (Goodin 1987: 187) . We exploit others when we use their vulnerabilities to secure for ourselves some form of benefit in a game of strategy. The vulnerable are "those whose interests are strongly affected by our actions and choices" (Goodin 1987: 191) . Further, Goodin argues that the responsibility to protect the vulnerable falls upon "whoever has the 'last clear chance' to prevent harm. . . regardless of the causal history up to that point" (Goodin 1986: 129 (Goodin 1987: 189) . Thus, A must refrain from choosing the (very prudential) lottery L 3 . Indeed, in many cases quite reasonable and morally uncontroversial actions (driving, hunting, playing sport) carry very small probabilities of catastrophic vulnerable outcomes that oblige others to do whatever they can to help us and thus, make these others' vulnerable to our choices. Not only is the prohibition of these prudent risks over-demanding, the self-undermining property of the account means that this prohibition is motivated by the obligation to avoid a consequence that Goodin's own theory obliges.
Solutions and Responses
Both the over-demandingness of Goodin's account and the self-frustration of Sample's are caused by the approaches' come-what-may duties. Broadly speaking, both Sample's and Goodin's accounts claim: S1 certain states of disadvantage generate duties 20 to aid and S2 exploitation involves a failure to discharge these duties.
When the states of disadvantage in S1 are unconstrained and imply obligations like BN, then the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge these obligations amounts to exploitation encounters either the self-frustration problem or the over-demandingness objection. These two problems can be solved by altering either S1 or S2. We might abandon Goodin's claim that any source of vulnerability can generate duties by limiting the states in S1 or the duties they imply. Or we might accept the accounts' claims about the obligating states and the reach of come-what-may duties, but deny S2's claim that a failure to discharge these duties amounts to exploitation. In this section I will consider these possibilities alongside Goodin's defence of come-what-may duties.
Abandoning Self-caused Disadvantage
If exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, then in order for A to exploit B,
A must have some kind of relative advantage over B; that is, B must be relatively Goodin's account limits neither the sources, nor the manifestations of disadvantage. His claim that exploitation involves a failure to protect the vulnerable "regardless of the particular source" of their vulnerability is an explicit rejection of limits on the sources of vulnerability (Goodin 1987: 187) . That Goodin also places no limits on vulnerability's manifestations follows from his account of vulnerability. As we saw above, Goodin claims that B is vulnerable to A with respect to x when A has the ability to control x and x has an impact on B.
Goodin's account of exploitation places no explicit limits on x. Exploitation in- If self-caused disadvantage is excluded as a form of exploitable disadvantage, then F1 is false. B is not obliged to respect the BN constraint when A is responsible for his basic needs going unmet. In this case, B does not exploit A when she fails to subsidise him and the conflict between F1 and F2 disappears.
Defending Come-what-may Duties
Goodin acknowledges that the "main alternative to assigning responsibility for protecting the vulnerable to those people to whom they are vulnerable" is to modify S1 by omitting self-caused disadvantage, that is, in Goodin's own words, "to assign responsibility for the task of getting people out of a jam to those who were causally responsible for getting them into that jam in the first place" (Goodin 1986: 125) . Thus, if people are vulnerable to themselves, then they are responsible for protecting themselves.
However, Goodin raises two interrelated objections to this solution, which provide a defense, not only of the come-what-may duties in his account, but also of Sample's D2. First, he notes, that " 'causal responsibility' is not the unambiguous, technical term it seems. The ascription of causal responsibility for an outcome represents. . . the conclusion of a moral argument, not the premise of one" (Goodin 1986: 126) . Second, he argues that "causal responsibility and task responsibility [the substantive responsibility to aid] really are quite distinct notions. They merge in their practical implications only in those (possibly rare) circumstances wherein those who were, in the past, in a position to cause harm will, in the future, remain in a position to provide help" (Goodin 1986: 127) . As an illustration Goodin offers the following case: "a speedboat racing past two sailboats produces a wake that, after a minute or two, causes one to capsize.
The responsibility for helping the capsized crew surely rests with the crew of the other sailboat still afloat, rather than with the speedboat that is by now long gone" (Goodin 1986: 126) .
Though these claims are (mostly) unobjectionable, they do not establish the conclusion Goodin wishes to defend. Consider the first. It is true that establishing causal responsibility is difficult and depends on moral claims about the scope of responsibility, but it is not true that it is never clear which parties are causally responsible for others' vulnerabilities-indeed, an implication of the boating case is that the motorboat is causally responsible for the capsizing.
Goodin's second claim is also largely true. Suppose that B is disadvantaged because of a past theft and that the thief is now dead. Clearly the thief, though causally responsible, cannot be responsible for protecting B's vulnerability when she transacts with A. This responsibility devolves, presumably, to A. However, one can object to Goodin's claim that responsibility to aid varies directly with ability to aid. Of course, at the limit-when the causally responsible has, one way or another, departed-they cannot be responsible for the task of aiding.
But when both the causally responsible and a third party are able to aid, it seems objectionable to claim that the responsibility for aiding falls on the third party if they are better able to aid. This brings us to the primary problem with Nevertheless, this does not establish that A must bear responsibility for his choice of L 1 in Γ 1 . In Γ 1 though he is causally responsible for his condition,
A is unable to aid himself. While the difficulty involved in finding the causally responsible party does not apply, to Γ 1 , Goodin's second difficulty does apply.
In Γ 1 the causally responsible is not in a position to provide aid. So while Goodin's principle may be objectionable when neither of these problems arises, it may still be attractive in the case of Γ 1 ; over-demandingness notwithstanding.
Marc Fleurbaey writes about a similar case of Bert the motorcyclist who is fully responsible for head injuries he sustains while riding his motorbike recklessly.
Bert's life can be saved only through a costly operation that Bert, who is uninsured, cannot afford. Like A, Bert is causally responsible for his situation, but he is unable to aid himself. (Fleurbaey 1995: 40) . 21 Though Fleurbaey grants that Bert bears full responsibility for his injury, he argues few "would agree with the 'no transfer' verdict" that holding Bert responsible would mandate (Fleurbaey 1995: 40 to luck (i.e., responsibility-sensitive) egalitarianism which claims "the luck egalitarian embrace of responsibility implausibly justifies leaving people without assistance in thoroughly bad situations if they are responsible for bringing them about" (Stemplowska 2009: 251) . Stemplowska believes the objection should be resisted. She reminds us that it "applies only to situations in which a person is responsible for his or her disadvantage due to his or her conduct unreasonably privileging his or her interests over those of others . . . and there are enough 21 See also Fleurbaey (2008: 153-198) .
resources equally to assist others who find themselves in similar situations" (Stemplowska 2009: 252) . Stemplowska notes that in such cases, the resources used to rescue Bert (or A) could also be "used by others on their own pursuits" (Stemplowska 2009: 253) . She concludes that to say the disadvantaged's claim on resources always wins is to endorse the implausible view that they have a claim of justice even in spiteful cases, where they become disadvantaged "on purpose" (Stemplowska 2009: 253) .
With a number of positions in the air, it is perhaps best to pause for a moment to take stock. In section three I outlined two problems for Sample's and is no duty to aid in cases of self-caused disadvantage, then both self-frustration and over-demandingness can be avoided by excluding self-caused disadvantage from S1. However, there is another solution that does not require an answer to the unacceptable outcomes objection.
Abandoning Exploitation Ascriptions
We can accept Goodin's principle that those best able to aid the disadvantaged are obliged to do so and avoid over-demandingness and self-frustration if we reject the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge duties to the disadvantaged amounts to exploitation. Suppose that though A chose L 1 , lost the lottery, and his basic needs are now unmet. Let us also grant Fleurbaey and Goodin the claim that B is obliged to provide A with some form of subsidy (BN) as aid.
Though this concession means that B must aid A, it does not also entail that the proper classification of his failure to do so is appropriately called 'exploitation'.
We may claim that B is obliged to subsidise A despite the fact that when she subsidises A she allows him to treat her unfairly. We do not need to abandon
the intuition that what A does is unfair in order to claim that B is obliged to provide aid. B's helping A may be grounded in something other than a concern for fairness.
However, if B's obligations to A are grounded in something other than fairness, then Goodin's and Sample's obligations of aid cannot be based on concerns about exploitation-at least insofar as exploitation is a matter of 'taking unfair advantage' (as both they and I presuppose). To put the point another way, if we want to maintain unconstrained forms of the claim in S1 that certain states of disadvantage generate duties to aid, then we must abandon the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge these duties involves unfairness, and by extension, exploitation. B may be obliged to aid A, but not in the name of exploitation.
Applying this insight to Goodin's account, we may say B is obliged to provide A with BN, not because BN is owed to A as a matter of fairness. Rather, if we agree with Goodin that there is such an obligation, this obligation is justified by an appeal to a concern for A's welfare. Similarly, for Sample, we no longer need to maintain the counterintuitive claim in F1 that B takes unfair advantage of A if she fails to ensure his basic needs are met when she transacts with him. Instead we can claim that if B fails to meet A's basic needs, she fails to treat him with respect, even though, in so respecting A, she allows A to exploit her. Since both accounts' obligations to aid can be grounded in concerns other than fairness,
there is no need to use the concept of exploitation to explain the obligation, especially since there is a cost to each theory for doing so: self-frustration and over-demandingness.
Nevertheless, this solution has its own problems. The most serious is that if the goal is to provide an analysis of the concept of exploitation, then abandoning S2 is no solution at all. Abandoning S2 involves abandoning the claim that a failure to discharge duties to the vulnerable in cases like Γ 1 is exploitation. If this failure does not amount to exploitation, then the attempt to analyse the concept in these terms fails. However, if the goal is instead to give an account of our duties to others when we engage in mutually beneficial transactions with them, the S2 solution may be attractive (though the wrongdoing must be relabelled).
Note that even if the goal is the latter, there are reasons to be sceptical about abandoning S2. If Goodin and Sample's obligations to aid are intended to fall within the domain of justice, then, since performing the just act in Γ 1 would require B to allow A to take unfair advantage of her, exploitation (as taking unfair advantage) must be only pro tanto unjust. It cannot be unjust from an all-things-considered perspective. In this case exploitation (and by extension fairness) are values that can be traded off against considerations such as welfare, and this, in turn, implies that justice for Sample and Goodin involves more than-and sometimes even undermines-fairness. 22 On the other hand, if the obligation is not intended to fall within some other domain of morality, then either the obligation trumps the obligations of justice, which is also undesirable, or it is trumped by the obligations of justice, and as such, is impotent.
Exploitation, Disadvantage, and Responsibility
The analysis of Γ 1 and the two solutions outlined above, provide concrete arguments for a conflict that, perhaps, in a more general form we have known all along: there is a tension between unconditional, 'come-what-may' duties and fairness. When a moral principle specifies duties of aid to others that are behaviour-insensitive, these duties create moral hazards. Of course, in many cases-e.g., the welfare state-the cost of these moral hazards is outweighed by the benefits that the baselines installed by such duties bring. But this is merely a practical point. Even if the number of those who free ride undermine the practicality of implementing unconditional 'safety nets', this does not erode the theoretical entitlement to aid of those who do not.
However, Goodin and Sample would go further. They would extend the theoretical entitlement to all disadvantaged (or, for Sample, all persons whose basic needs are unmet) by arguing that those who are in a position to aid have a duty to aid the disadvantaged even if their disadvantage is self-caused.
Goodin's response to the claim that this imposes unfair burdens on those who would aid is that "duties and responsibilities are not necessarily. . . things that you deserve. More often than not, they are things that just happen to you" (Goodin 1987: 133) . Perhaps this is true of some cases, but in Γ 1 these duties do not 'just happen' to B, they are caused by A's use of the moral hazard BN creates. Nevertheless, as I claimed in the discussion of the S2 solution, we may accept Goodin's arguments about a duty to aid all forms of vulnerability without also claiming that a failure to aid is unfair. When disadvantage is selfcaused it is not the failure to aid that is unfair, but the duty to aid. We may agree that other concerns override the unfairness, but to claim the unfairness runs in the opposite direction is absurd. 
